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REVIEW ARTICLE 
HOW CAN WE KNOW ABOUT KNOWING IN EDUCATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATION? 
Felicity Haynes 
The University of Western Australia 
. Colin W. Evers & Gabriele Lakomski (1991) Knowing 
Educational Administration Pergamon Press, 250 
jJp hdbk, c. A$85 
book is subtitled "Contemporary 
Methodological Controversies in Educational 
Administration Research". We are here not talking 
about educational administration as such, but 
about theories of educational administration, and 
at a level of abstraction which many 
administrators will find daunting. In describing 
prevailing controversies over epistemologies in 
educational administration, the authors present 
yet another one, namely whether their 
.. Quinean/holistic point of view can accommodate 
ethics and a rational knowledge without a 
foundational justification as flawed as the ones 
they criticise. 
Many of the chapters had appeared in discrete 
form by the two authors in international journals. 
They have been pulled together here skilfully and 
coherently. One cannot dispute the scholarly 
presentation of material. Educational 
administrators such as Griffiths, Greenfield, 
Hodgkinson, Hoy, Willower, Sergiovanni, 
Kemmis, Bates are discussed in some detail. 
Because their administrative policies are 
secondary to a pursuit of their epistemological 
assumptions, a prior knowledge of their work 
makes following the argument much easier. 
Writings from Dewey, Taylor, Simon, Gadamer, 
Habermas, Giddens, Churchlands provide a 
broader post-positivistic epistemological context 
to their argument. 
The authors begin from the assumption that 
"Promoting good rationality is ... a matter of promoting 
the kind of reasoning employed in and exhibited by 'our 
best theories'" (p. 183). What counts as 'best'? "We 
believe that the mistake lies with the epistemological 
enterprise of foundational justification ... Foundational 
justification proceeds typically by identifying an 
epistemically privileged set of claims and then 
attempting to use these to justifiJ other claims." 
(p.213). 
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Most of the educational administration theorists 
discussed in this book are defined as holding one 
of two types of foundationalist theories. Firstly, 
the oppositional diversity thesis is held by those who 
claim that research paradigms are 
incommensurable. "The scientists who live ill 
different paradigms live in different worlds". 
Popkewitz (1984, p. 35) for example divides 
educational sciences into the three paradigms -
empirical analytic (quantitative), symbolic 
(qualitative and interpretive) and critical (where 
political criteria are applied). Burrell and 
Morgan's (1982, p. 217) interpretive, functionalist, 
radical structuralist and radical humanist 
paradigms illustrate another four mutually 
exclusive sets of basic assumptions about the way 
research relates to the world. Qualitative (action 
research) is seen as incommensurable with 
quantitative models, because of their different 
goals - social improvement or validity. 
The second is a complemelltary diversity thesis 
which acknowledges that even the 
incommensurable paradigms used by Kuhn, 
Newtonian physics and quantum theory, 
continue to be used side by side in current 
scientific research. They are simply 
acknowledged to be serving different human 
purposes. This l1let/lOd%gical pluralism allows 
for appropriate ways of approaching different, or 
even the same, research problems and supports. 
Folk theories can coexist happily with meta-
analysis and behavioural science regardless of 
their different epistemological assumptions. The 
problem of how they can resolve their differences, 
or even if they need to, is left unanswered. Evers 
and Lakomski are content to avoid detailed 
discussion as to how Giddens can maintain the 
explanation/understanding distinction, for 
instance, simply referring (p. 225) to an 
unpublished 1987 paper by Jim Walker. In 
admitting the problem of unambiguously 
identifying educational research paradigms, they 
raise the question of how their own coherent 
theory can be placed outside a complementary 
diversity thesis. One of their main problems is the 
self-reference necessary to pursue a more 
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epistemological argument here. To even describe 
epistemologies as inadequate on the grounds of 
foundationalist theory is to be involved in the 
same sort of contradiction-generating paradox as 
"This sentence is false", for they must be 
criticising them from within an epistemology 
which is open to the same criticism. 
Evers and Lakomski argue that the very idea of 
research paradigms is mistaken and incoherent 
because it relies on a notion of observational 
truth, a distinction between paradigms and the 
'real' world. For them, shared concepts and 
justifications, meaning and truth are brought into 
a productive relation with one another through 
'touchstone' - which denies a distinction between 
rationality and content; good and problem-
solving; and ethical and empirical claims. 
Touchstone is defined (p. 233) as non-
foundationalist because it is merely the shifting 
and historically explicable amount of theory that 
is shared by rival theories and theorists. All our 
beliefs are in principle open to revision not 
against how they fit "the real world", but how 
they cohere with all of our other beliefs. This is a 
holistic theory operating not only according to 
empirical adequacy, but to principles of 
consistency, simplicity, comprehensiveness, 
fecundity, familiarity of principle and explanatory 
power (p. 229). So when Evers and Lakomski say 
(p. 213) "We do not need alternatives to science: we 
need better science", they appear prima facie to have 
considerably revised the notion of science. 
Logically, there need be no retreat to 
foundationalism. What counts as a better science 
from a coherentist view? Because it includes 
values, it shifts the emphasis from truth to 
evidence. How do we decide in judging 
contentious evidence which of the above 
principles are overriding? Even by including 
explanatory power, Evers and Lakomski are still 
begging the question about causal notions versus 
intentionality. If they allow reasons the same 
explanatory force as causes, as Davidson does, 
they might well by-pass it. But they make the 
mistake of reverting to a Quinean behaviourism, 
in which the meaning of a statement is still 
identified with the means of confirming evidence 
- they remain verificationists. The requirement of 
touchstone says it must be a theory that works, 
especially in such problems as getting researchers 
out of 'real' offices (p. 229). And the theory must 
not only be one which works but one which is seen 
to be working, i.e. it is still a behaviouristic view of 
science because the principles of simplicity and 
parsimony require us to focus on the relatively 
superficial aspects of any claim. To remove the 
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distinction between ethical and empirical 
is in this case to reduce the former to the 
Like Ted Trainer (1991) they reduce 
concepts or principles to their prudential value 
how they work in a shared world of 
action. Evers and Lakomski admit they 
reductionist, but they do not use the 
'behaviourist', because that might 
suspiciously like a foundationalist 
Quine (1990, pp. 37-8) is more explicit 
The behaviourist approach is mandatory. 
psychology one mayor may not be 
behaviourist, but in linguistics one has 
choice. Each of us learns his language 
observing other people's verbal behaviour 
having his own faltering verbal 
observed and reinforced and corrected by 
We depend strictly on overt behaviour 
observable situations... There is nothing 
linguistic meaning beyond what is to be 
from overt behaviou r in 
circumstances. 
A coherence view accounts better than 
falsification theory for the 
continuing to pursue theories 
when presented with particular 
examples. But if evidence rests on 
evidence rather than paradigm-theory, then 
we right to believe: 
1. that if our beliefs are mostly true, then they 
mostly coherent?; and 
2. that if "many of our beliefs cohere with 
others, then many of our beliefs are 
(Davidson)? 
For instance, Greenfield's subj 
apprehension of interpretations and a 
embedding of these into explanatory 
that invoke an agent's reasons and 
motivations is acknowledged as "a rela 
autonomous domain of discourse that is 
predictively useful and explanatorily economical" 
90). But Evers and Lakomski dismiss it as 
a folk theory which even if it is 
adequate now will prove to be false it is 
capable of integration with "the rest of 
developing scientific world view". "If humans 
complex physical systems and physical science is 
(at least in its domain of application), thell if 
fundamental theoretical categories of folk theory 
not found in physical science, folk theory will 
be false." And if the Churchlands' (1 
philosophy of mind were true then the above 
premises would be true. If intentionalist or 
hermeneutic views are dismissed from 
theory on the grounds of their truth or 
then Evers and Lakomski are operating 
a paradigmatic theory which they have 
as being foundationalist. 
they are using the notion of truth in some sort of 
non-foundationalist sense, their coherent 
requires either a desperate 
or dependence on power politics 
reach a decision on the theory which is strongest 
present circumstances" p. 233). Is the better 
the more popular one? Amongst 
administrators? Or the general 
This seems to me to be a dangerous 
"m[llll.ll-"~' Because favoured research methods are 
.$lJL<,HUU--"'} oriented, are they then the best, even 
rest on an outdated foundationalism? 
be comprehensive because of their 
simply because of their reductive quality 
Broglie's quote from physics: There IS 
so dangerous as a precise definition "). To 
quantitative science over qualitative 
may have less to do with truth, even 
truth, than political history, and we 
worry a bit about the consequence for 
and intentions1. 
despite the acknowledged acceptance by even 
LILIllU.:tLH and Campbell (p. 223) of the limitations 
of sole allegiance to a single viewpoint about 
knowledge and practice, Evers and Lakomski are 
with the foundationalists' problem of an 
'>eloisternically privileged set of claims, namely 
touchstone of scientific materialism, 
much faith in the capacity of 
or hermeneutics to overthrow 
touchstones. Acknowledging Greenfield's 
that the standard of truth is only as 
1J1"U'>lLJ<e as the background theories it is being 
to adjudicate (p. 79) allows them to rob 
schemata of their point. They are 
self-referential paradox. To dismiss 
beliefs as indicative of mere 
diversity rather than 
eDistemc.lolnciil diversity (p. 224) is simply to 
i1111<:t,."tp Evers' and Lakomski's assumption that 
knowledge is founded upon scientific method. If 
We really want to discard the use of the word 
'true' (p. 227), then we have to acknowledge that 
touchstone really must be more than the 
behaviourist/materialist agenda Evers and 
Lakomski have for it. The hermeneuticists who 
believe that meaning is meta-empirical may not 
be incommensurable with behaviourists, but 
merely assign less importance to emp~rical 
science within their epistemology. In placmg a 
higher priority on meta-empirical matters, they 
are merely redefining their touchstone to include 
16, No. 2,1991 
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feelings, intentions, desires, understandings as a 
valuable component of knowing. 
I want mind and matter to be held in equal regard. 
by educational administrators and believe they 
can do this within a coherent unity theory even If 
they have to concede that our conceptual 
construction and speculative interpretation is 
dependent upon and constructed fron;t within a 
sensed world. To accept Churchlands' argument 
(1990, p. 87) that "it goes against modem 
psychological evidence that one's introspective 
judgements are on all fOI!rs with percep~u~l 
judgements generally, and proVide knowledge that IS III 
110 way distinguished by any special status, purity or 
authority" is simply to beg the question as to the 
priority of psychological research. Poets and 
artists may have as much social efficacy and 
certainly provide as much meaning. I believe 
(with the poets and artists) in an indubitable 
awareness of an individual self which can guide 
actions with as much force as external causes, and 
becomes more than a Churchlandish neural 
network. It uses imagination as well as logic to 
draw meaningful associations between theories, 
people, situations and experiences. Because we 
are working with people, and know our 
intentions in dealing with them, our construction 
of them as persons rather than historical bundles 
of acquired habits, we as educational 
administrators have to question further the 
arguments underlying the Evers and Lakomski 
behaviourist epistemology. 
I can accept the need for a coherentist theory 
without the Quinean materialism. I am probably 
happier with the Davidsonian/Dennett holistic 
theory (more compatible with Greenfield and 
Sergiovanni) which begins in our sensed world 
and constructs a more human shared reality from 
that. Ironically, even though Churchland believes 
that a completed neuroscience will embody the 
essential wisdom about our inner nature, he 
leaves space in his final chapter to allow for the 
value of introspective consciousness, even if it 
becomes little more than awareness of glucose 
consumption in the fore-brain, dopamine levels in 
the thalamus and so on. Self-awareness is 
something Evers and Lakomski say little about 
and the phenomenologists place a priority on. 
My postgraduate courses on ethics in educational 
administration have provided some evidence for 
believing that one of the important ways of 
knowing educational administration is precisely a 
reflection which creates self-awareness in the 
educational administrator to think about his/her 
own sets of values, and her/his reasons for 
holding them as well as testing those assumptions 
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against the "real world" schools. Ironically, 
though its language and erudition make it 
difficult to access, this book could well be used to 
generate such reflection. There should be more 
room within the coherent theory to allow for 
further debate between the humanists and the 
materialists. 
END NOTE 
1. For instance, see my article "On equitable 
cakecutting" (Haynes, 1989) where I argue that Dawkins 
presents a case for funding more women in maths and 
science on the grounds of equity, but does not argue for 
more men in arts and education because he "sees" the 
problem of equity I equality through a lens of national 
productivity rather than personal rights. He is coherent 
and he can provide facts to back up his case, but still 
there remain other ways [perhaps less powerful] of 
construing the facts, and defining the problem. 
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BOOK REVIEW 
F. (1989), The Examiner: James Booth and the 
of common examinations. University of 
Printing Service, Leeds, 1989, pp. viii + 
use of examinations in the educative process 
quickly throughout Western education 
", .. do"," since the time of their central role in the 
of educational opportunities 
century England. Examination 
has been evolutionary and revolutionary 
nature, involving a number of stages, 
institutions, catalytic events and 
reactions. Debate on their role has been 
VHLU'ULV continual, at times fierce and sometimes 
Teacher educators should be aware 
this debate and its historical origins for during 
past one hundred and fifty years examining 
been at the very heart of the schooling process 
in .Western society. 
.Examinations, their form and operation, have 
issues of controversy in English 
A number of United Kingdom 
ve discussed the development and role 
examinations. These include Sir P. Hartog and 
E.G. Rhodes' An Examination of Examinations 
(1936) and The Marks of Examiners (1936), J.L. 
Brereton's The Case for Examinations: An account of 
place in Education with some proposals for their 
(1944), G.B. Jeffery's External Examinations 
Secondary Schools (1958), RJ. Montgomery's 
Examinations : An account of their evolution as 
administrative devices in England (1965), J. Roach's 
Public Examinations in England: 1850-1900 (1971), 
R Dore's The Diploma Disease : Education, 
and Development (1976) and R. 
.uu.~"'vu s (Ed.). Days of Judgement : Science, 
EXaminations and the Organization of Knowledge in 
late Victorian Times (1982). In spite of their obvious 
and the attention paid them, these 
O'LlU"::O do not represent an over-abundance of 
flllSt()nlcal research into the actual origins of 
English school examinations. Moreover, Foden in 
his book The Examiner correctly observes: 
... educational historians have,for the most part, 
tended to lack a proper focus for their treatment 
of examinations, and their accounts of how they 
came to have a significant role in the education 
system are often casual and inaC(:urate. Some 
quite respectable historians tend to make 
commonplace mistakes about the arrival and 
impact of examinations. (p. 112). 
Examinations began to be woven into the fabric of 
the education system of Britain during the period 
(1852-1857) when James Booth was a member and 
later President of the Society for the 
Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and 
Commerce, now known as the Royal Society of 
Arts. Once they were introduced into the English 
education system their use spread "like an 
epidemic disease" (p. 111). In his book, The 
Examiner, Foden endeavours to add to the history 
of education literature regarding the significance 
of examinations to the provision of education. He 
observes that in traditional educational histories 
the introduction of examinations; 
have usually been treated as interesting addenda 
to other and more important developments, the 
initiatives of reformers, the foundations of new 
institutions, government reports and Acts of 
Parliament. Their organic significance in the 
whole system tends to be missed. (p. 111) 
The book is both a biography and a history of the 
origins of examinations. It traces the major events 
in the life of J ames Booth, an energetic Irishman, 
who was foremost in setting in motion the process 
whereby examinations formed a critical role in 
English education. Foden devotes separate 
chapters to the various stages of the life of Booth 
and intertwines the history of the origin of public 
examinations conducted by the Society of Arts 
around his central character. The chapter 
headings illustrate this intermingling of 
biography and examination history. The first four 
chapters are biographical with titles such as 
Trinity Graduate, Irish Emigrant; Mathematician, 
Teacher; Priest and Industrial Educator followed 
by six chapters on the history of the origins of 
examinations. The final two chapters complete 
the biography of Booth. 
The book should be required reading for those 
interested in the history of assessment. It has 
many features that recommend it to educational 
and social historians. The technique of 
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